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What are the extents of an artwork, where does it begin and where does it end? To what 
extent are practice and research entwined as relational objects of thinking?
This text is based on my observations and reflections on the process of research (which I 
regard as a process of finding things out) and its relation to making things. It is written from 
a subjective perspective but this has been informed by a number of different viewpoints, 
ideas, artworks, theories, and not least, my own practical experience. An ongoing 
preoccupation has been the question of where exactly the artwork is, or perhaps more 
accurately, where the significance of the work lies. Is it in the object, in its relation to its 
context or to its viewer (as in an institutional theory of art), in this viewer's involvement with 
the work, or perhaps somewhere else? And in relation to the present context, can the 
process and methods that are characterised as “research” be identified with art making?
Research practice is, by its nature and definition, directed externally. The artwork similarly 
structures its relationship with the world, whether this is acknowledged or anticipated by 
the artist or not. It may implicate the viewer or indicate how it is to be regarded. So too, 
viewers carry their own worlds around with them, sets of acquaintances that refract the 
work, and make of it something else. An artwork may take different forms (a text, image, 
object, or event for example) but it seems to me that art is as much an activity as a thing, 
in terms of both making things and engaging with the things, places or people around it. As 
artists or viewers we participate in this activity and what we refer to as an artwork may only 
be an aspect of this activity, an artefact or phenomenon whose significance is bound up 
with the forms and processes that structure it but which also has a necessarily elliptical 
and dialogic nature. Choices are adopted in the artwork that differentiate it from its 
surroundings or from other works but, to borrow Howard Becker's phrase, it possesses a 
fundamental indeterminacy or incompleteness (Becker, 2001).
In order for something to be seen as an artwork, we must have some prior expectation of it 
and its surroundings. It becomes problematic to talk of the “work itself” as the thing (the 
image, object, event etc.) may be experienced under different circumstances or conditions, 
its different “viewers” bringing different prejudices, motivations or desires to bear on it. 
Later in his life, Duchamp talked of an art-coefficient, which he described as the initial 
difference between an artist's intention and its realisation in the work. The initial intention 
might be distorted, refracted, magnified or amplified through a particular material process, 
for example, and this refraction might affect subsequent intentions, gestures or judgments. 
The point at which one decides that no further iterations are necessary might be regarded 
as the point at which “the work itself” coheres but this is only the beginning. The set of 
differences or, one might say, the internal and external dialogues that lead to the work, are 
subsequently magnified in the viewer's reconstruction of the work: the viewer creates 
another work based on the initial work, which remains as a source for further dialogues 
and experiences, further differences (Duchamp, 1957).
On a related but perhaps more polemical tack, Joseph Kosuth proposes a mode of artistic 
operation that somehow addresses the work's context, asserting that “the meaning of art is 
how we describe it” (Kosuth, 1994). For Kosuth writing in the early 1990s, the difficulty of 
distinguishing “the meaning of cultural forms outside of a network of power relations” could 
imply that art risks losing sight of its critical role and thus descending into pastiche, 
fashionable decoration or bombast. In response to this he proposes that art be reflexive, 
that it consider “the uses of its elements within the work and the function of that work 
within its larger cultural societal framework” and he sees in Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
the limits of language a useful model for structuring such an artistic method. What 
distinguishes art from informative language is that it not only describes or shows reality, 
but it can potentially describe how it describes. By inhabiting the gap between visual and 
linguistic forms, the work can somehow articulate that which falls outside the scope of 
language. This “unsayable” is the attribute which for Kosuth constitutes value. It is the 
element which, not being tied to the fact of the artwork, its material expression, relates 
directly to the artwork's reception or reconstruction by a viewer. The work punctuates the 
flow of discourse across its surface, and its meaning becomes apparent through this 
process. Artistic activity (perhaps over and above production) engenders viewer activity, 
the artist's role being, perhaps, to structure and question the nature, type and purpose of 
this activity. The work's meaning is revealed through the conjunction of viewer, work and 
world, in a process which is ultimately fluid, dynamic and mobile.
In the light of this, I recall a symposium at the Guildhall in London in June 2005, entitled 
“What work does the artwork do 2?”, at which Art & Language presented a text in the 
context of a multi-element artwork, concurrently on show in the Guildhall gallery (Art & 
Language, 2005). They described their work - and the generation of this particular artwork 
- in response to the symposium title and to their reflections on Niklas Luhmann's writings 
on art as a social system, articulating an idea of practice (and referring to their actual 
practice) that is not solely concerned with agency - the work's effectiveness - but rather 
with what might be called the artwork's understanding of itself. What they described as a 
work's externality, its capacity to raise questions about itself and the institutions that house 
it, is necessarily determined by its internal structure and organisation. The work's 
significance does not reside solely in its context (as in an institutional theory of art) but in 
the fact that the artwork “knows about its context from within”. It is secure in its own 
indeterminacy. It effectively arbitrates how it is encountered but the implication is also that 
the work that the artwork does or doesn't do is contingent on a broader concept of the 
artwork itself. During the discussion, Mel Ramsden of Art & Language expressed his 
concern about, as he saw it, the apparent, current disavowal of the idea of the artwork as a 
“singular entity”, somehow distinguished from its surroundings. Hesitatingly, he invoked the 
idea of autonomy, proposing the artwork as a specific, internally organised thing that is not 
solely constituted by its relation to the institutions, conditions, audiences etc. external to it. 
A thing that is differentiated from and orientated within these surroundings such that it is 
able to tell us about them in some way.
And something that I've only recently come to realise fully is that artworks are interesting 
because they're singular, and at the same time they also remind you of all other 
artworks… The artwork is a figure on a ground - not a stable and established figure 
ground, but a shifting one - and you have to make up the relationship and construct it out 
of the contradictions that arise as you go on. And it seems to me that the more internally 
coherent, vivid and powerful art is - I hate to use this word because I'm sure some people 
in this room will jump on me for it - the more autonomous it is, the more it tells us about the 
background. (Art & Language, 2005)
The artwork is realised through communicative events, events engendered by it, 
surrounding it, and inflected by it. But drawing on Art & Language's and specifically their 
use of Luhmann's understanding of art as an autopoeitic system (a term originally coined 
by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, autopoeisis literally means autoproduction), 
that is, a self-referential, recursive system that is “operationally closed” and yet shares a 
“structural coupling” with its environment, the work itself poses questions and puzzles and 
by so doing differentiates a realised space from an unmarked, potential space. Those 
engaging with the work inhabit this space of possibility, and thereby determine it. The idea 
is of a reflexive artwork, a reflective practice that poses questions, a system that 
incorporates the relation between itself as a system and its environment into its processes, 
as Art & Language quote Luhmann, “in the form of a relationship between self-reference 
and hetero-reference.”
That's the point of our practice of describing and re-describing – i.e. of attempting to 
generate hetero-reference or, under another description, dialogic aura. That's the way it 
works. This is a way that art can be integrated into the everyday: by accepting, describing 
and re-describing its own differentiation as form. (Art & Language, 2001)
To collapse this train of thought, such a reflective practice provides a useful example, at 
one end of the spectrum, at least, for those engaged in research practice. There is no 
distinction between the activity of making and the activities of thinking, describing, 
reflecting, writing and public dialogue. The artwork has no immutable status. It is an 
invitation to construct possible meanings, perspectives, ways of viewing the world, or 
“novel apprehensions”, as Stephen Scrivener has suggested (Scrivener, 2002). The 
process of research is productive in that the artwork and whatever is said or written about 
it are pulling in the same direction. Their purposes are aligned. Thought and action operate 
in unison and in dialogue.
Artists are embedded in a matrix of institutions, allegiances and acquaintances and much 
of an artist's work is a form of engagement with, interpretation or repetition of the work of 
others or indeed of his or her own work, both acknowledged, tacit etc. The working 
process is a form of dialogue with these acquaintances and such conversations implicitly 
affect the character and direction of the work. In this sense, the notions of dialogue 
variously articulated by Mikhail Bakhtin, Vilém Flusser and physicist David Bohm are 
useful not only when thinking about these acquaintances or the relationship between 
spectator and work, but also in terms of framing the relationship between differing sources 
or activities. In a broad definition, dialogue may be both externalised and internalised. It 
suggests an acknowledgement of the importance of the other person, of the other point of 
view. As a method, it reflects the very essence of difference in a broader social context, a 
characteristic polyphony described by Bakhtin as 'heteroglossia', the coexistence of a 
multitude of different voices, speech types and utterances that contribute to the fabric of a 
society (Bakhtin, 1934). In Bohm's notion of dialogue, which draws on Michael Polanyi's 
thinking, shared meaning emerges from what he refers to as the “tacit ground” (Bohm, 
1996: 16), a substrate both of the unspoken and the understood, an underlying sense 
which cannot be described but which is somehow known. Thinking is a tacit process and 
what we say explicitly is only a small part of what we think. The work - the thing that 
becomes externally manifest in order to realise or to communicate – emerges from this 
shared ground. It is embedded in a process and context, the constellation of ideas, 
thoughts, feelings and practices that inform it. This thing, depending on how it is used 
(framed, posited etc.), can function in different ways. In order to communicate its sense, in 
a broad sense of the word, it necessarily implies and requires engagement on the part of 
someone. Although the idea of a singular object or image that embodies an idea seems 
somewhat problematic, this thing may emerge in response to a train of thought and reflect 
the operations of that thinking. The idea is not present in the image, for example, but the 
image may create the conditions that enable an idea to occur to someone looking at it. 
I would define art as an activity that extends human consciousness through constructs that 
transpose natural phenomena from that qualitatively undifferentiated condition that we call 
'life' into objective and internally focused concepts… [Appearance is brought to the 
foreground and then suspended so that the visual functions as a document that exists to 
serve as a structural part of a conceptual system.] … Whatever is visual in the work exists 
arbitrarily and its real existence remains as itself – 'in life' along with everything else – and 
separate from art or the purposes of art. (Huebler, 1992: 173)
I have a feeling he would be horrified to hear this but Douglas Huebler's definition seems 
curiously suited to the artwork's place or status in terms of research, as an aspect of an 
activity and a system, but not necessarily confined to it. This attitude lends his work a 
particular lightness, but in the present context, it implies that the non-informative object, 
whatever form that might take, does not have to be responsible for embodying or 
communicating anything beyond its own purposes, whatever they might be. It can just be 
what it is, something that is seen, read or experienced as any other thing in the world, and 
perhaps not only a world determined by the institutions of art. (Indeed, this is where the 
idea of research in the context of art could be interesting and productive, as a way of 
questioning these institutions.)
Research with a lowercase “r”, for me, delineates the totality of a practice. An artwork or an 
artefact may indicate an aspect (if not the essence) of the research which may then be 
accessed and articulated in greater depth elsewhere but perhaps a combination of work(s) 
in various forms can help construct a understanding of the research's trajectory. I am 
interested in what might be called a distributed work comprising a network of forms or 
elements, perhaps because this mirrors or replicates the gap described above within the 
very fabric of the work. Working across a number of “object-instances”, the gaps between 
things can act as a speculative, conjectural space for understanding, imagining, reverie, 
and so on. This involves accepting and incorporating the possibility for the unexpected, the 
unanticipated, and the unlegislated to arise. Research does not have to preclude the 
unknown and indeed, such intrusions may offer opportunities to distinguish the research 
as a working practice as opposed to a theoretical proposition (a proposal, for instance). 
Offering perhaps an expanded understanding of what an art practice might be, the entirety 
of the project is the product of the research, not just those things that have the 
conventional appearance of artworks. 
A point of contention seems to be that art does not on the whole really concern itself with 
knowledge in the philosophical sense of a true, justified belief, or certain understanding. 
But perhaps it is not so much that art does or doesn't concern itself with knowledge, more 
that as spectators or protagonists we don't really look to art for knowledge, in this sense of 
the word. Art today encompasses so many varying approaches that it seems unreasonable 
to claim it does not concern itself with conveying or containing knowledge in some way, or 
at least in some instances. Knowledge can be recovered from something, a text or a 
mathematical equation, for example. But these linear systems were developed in order to 
clarify and express experience, to make sense of the world. They are constructions that 
enable humans to store and communicate information and retrieve knowledge with 
(varying) degrees of certainty and agreement. 
Vilém Flusser's philosophy is characterised by his repeated and polemical assertion that 
the history of western civilisation is aligned with the development – over thousands of 
years - of linear thinking, as manifested at first in writing and subsequently in mathematical 
notation. 1 He suggested that the development of written language was a progressive 
attempt to demystify the image, to break it up into parts and to lay it out in sequence, 
thereby leading to the development of a historical consciousness characterised by linear 
thinking, that superseded a symbolic, magical consciousness rooted in the image. For 
Flusser, in the pursuit of clarity over indeterminacy, writing developed as a means of 
determining the world unequivocally. Information can be encoded and decoded to become 
knowledge, in the sense referred to above, certain understanding. Images perhaps 
function differently.Unlike texts (as they are predominantly experienced), an image is not 
confined to a linear dimension. It may operate in a lateral fashion, offering a space to 
inhabit as much as a path to follow. It presents a wholeness, a synchronic totality that is 
animated by the observer. In this sense, for Flusser, images are magical. In contrast to the 
image's open surface, the text necessitates the eye's direction along a path in order to 
receive a specific, coded message. 'Linear codes demand a synchronization of their 
diachronicity. They demand progressive reception' (Flusser, 2002).
Depending on one's motivations as a practitioner - thinking, writing, looking, picturing, 
making and so on - share a common subject (the person doing the thinking, writing, 
looking etc.) but they remain, however, distinct activities, imposing particular demands and 
working conditions. Artists have on the whole tended to use means other than texts to 
reflect their experience and thinking. But just because one might reflect on an image or 
object or, indeed, a piece of writing, doesn't mean that that thing or activity, or its 
motivating principle, is necessarily explained or that the curiously shadowy processes, that 
escape consciousness or articulated thought – what Poe refers to as intuition – will 
somehow be unmasked or compromised. 2 Why shouldn't externalised reflection be 
productive? 
As Jean-Marie Schaeffer claims, artworks are as much 'operating structures' as structured 
operations (Schaeffer, 1998: 48). They presuppose a context and an audience, whether 
this is consciously or tacitly acknowledged. They are not isolated, even though they may 
be made in isolation (and perhaps never experienced, remaining potential rather than 
actual, rather like the unknown masterpiece in Balzac's tale). Within this matrix, in the 
words of Art & Language, the artwork potentially differentiates a marked, singular, 
internally structured space from an unmarked space, that of everyday life. Perhaps within 
this unmarked world, the significance is not in the form of the artwork but in the relation 
between it as a rigorous, singular thing or event, the situation or questions it poses, and 
the experience it engenders. The work's rigour and vividness are aspects of how it 
operates in relation to the people, ideas, precedents, influences that contribute to its 
shape. One's locality, one's predispositions and one's environment (precisely articulated or 
vaguely sensed) necessarily nourish, sustain and distinguish the work. This shared 
territory enables the work to be seen and identified. If the context enables the thing to be 
seen as a specific rather than a generic object, the fundamental indeterminacy of the 
artwork still remains and this indeterminacy enables it to operate in diverse ways. Rather 
than offering certainty, it offers a way of seeing and imagining the world. Perhaps this is 
why we generally do not look to art for knowledge. It may engender a state of mind, offer a 
world to inhabit, or suggest a realm of the possible. 
In principle, my idea is of a research practice that engages with and absorbs things and 
interests outside itself but as well as an engagement with such things, it articulates or 
reflects on itself and its processes in relation to this environment. Perhaps my sense is as 
much of a research-led practice as it is a practice-based research. Texts enable different 
ways of seeing or framing practice and the approach to practice. They thereby affect the 
nature of practice. The directions of, the motivations behind the practice may likewise 
affect the nature of the research (those activities that aren't characterised as practice). A 
dialogue takes place between them. This may never be audible but might remain 
internalised. Crucially, the work's internality is directed outwards to the external world. 
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